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This Article reviews the comprehensive empirical study of the
bankruptcy mortgage foreclosure process conducted by Professor
Katherine Porter and subsequently published in 2008 in the Texas
Law Review. The results of her study, which analyzed 1,768 proof of
claim submissions filed in a sample of 1,733 Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceedings, strongly suggest that there is a pervasive failure on the
part of mortgage creditors to meet all of the formal documentation re-
quirements for filing such bankruptcy claims. This documentation
failure arguably impedes many mortgage debtors or bankruptcy trust-
ees from reviewing these claims for their accuracy.
Porter's conclusion that the itemization statements included in
even formally complete proof of claim filings are often confusing
enough to prevent debtors and trustees from meaningfully evaluating
their accuracy, however, is less well grounded. In addition, her data
does not unambiguously support her conclusion that there is likely
widespread and cumulatively significant overcharging of mortgage
debtors being facilitated by these proof of claim documentation defi-
ciencies. These data results are also consistent with more benign ex-
planations of the pervasive discrepancies she identifies between
creditors' and debtors' perceptions of the amounts owing. Porter's rec-
ommendations for reforms in the bankruptcy mortgage foreclosure
process consequently cannot be properly assessed without further re-
search establishing the extent of such creditor abuse.
t Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
J.D., Yale Law School, Ph.D., University of Iowa. I would like to thank the law firm of
Barrett, Daffm, Frappier, Turner & Engel, LLP for the financial and research data sup-
port that it has provided to me to facilitate my writing of this Article. In the interests of
full disclosure, I would like to note that this firm includes among their clients a number
of large mortgage servicing corporations that have an interest in the issues addressed in
this Article. I remain solely responsible, however, for all positions that I have taken in
this Article, and any mistakes or omissions in this work are my responsibility alone.
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008 Professor Katherine Porter published in the Texas Law
Review a comprehensive empirical article regarding mortgage claims
filed in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings.1 That article was made
widely available to researchers on the Social Science Research Net-
work electronic library several months prior to publication in the
Texas Law Review. 2 Her work has influenced the public debate re-
garding the need for mortgage lending and foreclosure reform.3 While
her findings are interesting and suggestive of the need for reforms,
there are, however, limits to the conclusions that can be drawn as to
the extent of mortgage servicer abuse of mortgage debtors. Moreover,
while Porter is a careful scholar who candidly recognizes the various
limitations of her analysis, there are indications that some people will
misuse her work by overlooking those limitations in an attempt to use
her study to justify calls for increased regulation of mortgage
servicers.4
In this Article, I will point out some of the limitations of Porter's
study and offer my thoughts on what one can fairly conclude from her
findings as to the extent of mortgage servicer abuse. For the purposes
1. Katherine M. Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage
Claims, 87 TEx. L. REV. 121 (2008). Katherine Porter is an Associate Professor at the
University of Iowa College of Law. Porter's study was also funded by an external
source, in this instance the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges' Endowment for
Education. Id. at 140-41 & n.123. Porter's co-principal investigator in this study was
Tara Twomey, formerly a clinical instructor at Harvard Law School, and currently a
Lecturer in Law at Stanford Law School and a consultant for the National Association
of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys and for the National Law Center (neither of which
had any involvement in this study). Id. at 140 & n.122.
2. The article has been available in draft form on the Social Sciences Research
Network ("SSRN") electronic library website since November 7, 2007, and as of Decem-
ber 27, 2011, it had been downloaded from that site 2679 times. See Katherine M.
Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, SSRN (Aug. 14,
2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1027961 (showing the posted
date of the article and statistical information on the number of times downloaded).
3. Porter has also given Senate hearing testimony regarding her results. Policing
Lenders and Protecting Homeowners: Is Misconduct in Bankruptcy Fueling the Foreclo-
sure Crisis?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S.
Committee on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Policing Lenders] (state-
ment of Katherine M. Porter, Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law).
As a result of this testimony and of the widespread dissemination of her work, her study
became influential even before its formal law journal publication. See, e.g., Steven Sei-
denberg, Homing in on Foreclosure, A.B.A. J., July 2008, at 54, 59 (citing to the Porter
study regarding the extent to which bankruptcy petitions contain questionable mort-
gage fees).
4. Compare Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 59 (claiming Porter's findings had deter-
mined "more than half' of the bankruptcy petitions that she had reviewed contained
"questionable" fees), with Porter, supra note 1, at 23 (finding "dozens and dozens" of
"suspicious" fees in a sample of 1483 itemization statements, which may mean that as
few as 3.2% of those itemization statements contained such suspicious fees, and of
course, some of which fees may prove upon closer investigation to be fully justified).
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of this Article, I will make a few simplifying assumptions. First, I will
assume Porter's underlying assertions as to the formal requirements
of mortgage foreclosure law and bankruptcy law are correct. In partic-
ular, I will assume her assertion is correct that under Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure Section 3001 ("Section 3001") mortgage credi-
tors who wish to receive a distribution from the bankruptcy estate
must submit a proof of claim, which includes an itemized statement of
the principle loan amount and any fees and charges imposed thereon,
a copy of the underlying promissory note, and a copy of the mortgage
agreement. In addition, I have not independently verified Porter's un-
derlying empirical data. I have reviewed only the summary statistics,
discussions of data collection procedures, and statistical methodology
presented in her article. I will assume that her research was con-
ducted in good faith and that the statistics she presents regarding the
incompleteness of proof of claim filings and the discrepancies between
debtor and creditor calculations of the amounts owed are accurate
with regard to the sample of proof of claim submissions she has con-
sidered. My focus instead will be on whether these sample statistics,
assuming that they are accurately calculated from her data, provide
sufficient support to justify any conclusions as to the extent of mort-
gage servicer abuse.
In her article, Porter asserts two main claims, one that is explicit
and one that is more implicit, and then presents a set of recommenda-
tions as to legislative, regulatory, and advisory committee action to
address the problems she identifies. She explicitly claims her study
reveals a rather striking degree of non-compliance with Section 3001
requirements by mortgage creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. 5 She
finds that many proof of claim submissions do not include a copy of the
promissory note, a copy of the mortgage agreement, or an adequately
detailed and transparent itemization of fees and charges. Some even
fail altogether to include such an itemized statement, and some sub-
missions evidenced more than one of these deficiencies. She argues
that this non-compliance creates the potential for mortgage servicers
to overcharge debtors without being held accountable for this over-
reaching given the difficulties that these deficient proof of claim sub-
missions present for debtors and their attorneys and bankruptcy
trustees who wish to mount effective challenges to such overcharges. 6
I will henceforth refer to this claim made by Porter as the "pervasive
proof of claim deficiencies" argument.
Porter also implicitly suggests that the increased potential for
abuse allegedly made possible by the prevalence of incomplete or oth-
5. Porter, supra note 1, at 149.
6. Id. at 161.
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erwise deficient proof of claim submissions has actually led to wide-
spread abuse. This abuse, she argues, justifies legislative and/or
regulatory efforts to encourage or even require mortgage creditors to
provide more comprehensive and transparent proof of claim submis-
sions. More comprehensive submissions, she asserts, will deter ineq-
uitable conduct by enabling debtors and their attorneys and
bankruptcy trustees to more easily recognize and contest creditor
overcharges. I will henceforth refer to Porter's second and more im-
plicit claim as the "widespread mortgage creditor abuse" argument.
Porter also offers some recommendations for legislative, regulatory,
and advisory committee actions to address these alleged abuses.7 I
will henceforth refer to these recommendations as the "Porter
recommendations."
In this Article, I will assess each of her claims, focusing on
whether her statistical study provides adequate support for her con-
clusions. I will then briefly discuss the merits of her recommendations
and what further research is needed to properly evaluate them. First,
however, I have summarized my overall conclusions as follows:
Porter's pervasive proof of claim deficiencies argument is reasona-
bly persuasive. As I will discuss below, there are a number of specific
criticisms that can be made of her data collection and statistical analy-
sis methodology, and these criticisms collectively undercut, to some
extent, her broad assertions about the pervasiveness of such proof of
claim deficiencies in foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings. Her
conclusions as to the extent of the incompleteness of proof of claim
submissions, however, are nevertheless striking and relatively robust.
Even if those conclusions are appropriately discounted because of her
study's various methodological shortcomings, she still presents a per-
suasive case for the proposition that the incompleteness of bankruptcy
proof of claim submissions by mortgage creditors is widespread
enough to at least create the potential for exploitation of mortgage
debtors.
Porter's related arguments that even formally complete proof of
claim filings often present a serious potential for abuse because of
their inadequate or confusing itemization of fees and charges, how-
ever, are much more subjective, impressionistic, and lacking in solid
statistical foundation. More importantly, Porter supports her argu-
ment that these proof of claim deficiencies not only create the poten-
tial for significant abuse of mortgage debtors, but are in fact
facilitating a great deal of abuse, with only a very selective presenta-
tion of anecdotal cases and commentary. Her statistics that convinc-
ingly demonstrate the pervasive extent of proof of claim submission
7. See id. at 173-78 (making a series of recommendations for reform).
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incompleteness, and that at least suggest that even formally complete
submissions are often difficult to meaningfully review for accuracy,
simply do not establish the extent to which such alleged abuses of
debtors are actually occurring. In several places in her article Porter,
to her credit, somewhat reluctantly but candidly concedes this point.
Porter's failure to establish the extent of such creditor abuse
sharply undercuts her arguments for legislative and regulatory inter-
ventions to reduce proof of claim submission incompleteness and other
deficiencies. It is not clear from her study how much creditor abuse is
now taking place that would possibly be detected or deterred by such
measures. It is, therefore, not possible to determine whether the addi-
tional administrative costs that her more stringent proof of claim re-
quirements would impose on mortgage creditors and bankruptcy
trustees would be a cost-justified means of improving the fairness of
the bankruptcy process. Thus, the overall merits of her recommenda-
tions are unclear at this time. Before Porter's proposals can be prop-
erly evaluated, more research is needed to establish the extent and
magnitude of such abuse, the extent to which such abuse could be de-
tected or deterred by Porter's proposed reforms, and the costs of these
reforms.
II. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE "PROOF OF CLAIM
DEFICIENCIES" ARGUMENT
The heart of Porter's study is a summary of the degree of formal
completeness shown by the 1,768 proof of claim submissions filed in a
sample of 1,733 Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings initiated during
April of 2006.8 She concluded that there is a strikingly high incidence
of incompleteness: 41.1% of the proof of claim filings did not include a
copy of the promissory note, 19.6% did not include a copy of the mort-
gage agreement, and 16.1% did not include an itemized statement of
fees and charges. 9 Overall, 52.77% of the proof of claim filings in her
sample lacked one or more of these three documents that Section 3001
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure ("Section 3001")
requires. °
There are a number of reasons why the samples' incompleteness
percentages may overstate (or perhaps understate) the extent of proof
of claim submission incompleteness in bankruptcy proceedings. First,
the sample of 1,733 bankruptcy cases, from which she obtained the
1,768 proof of claim filings, came from only forty-four judicial districts
8. Porter, supra note 1, at 144-52. These findings are graphically summarized in
Figure 1 on page 146 of Porter's article.
9. Id. at 146-48.
10. Id. at 146.
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in twenty-four states and ignored bankruptcy filings from the other
twenty-six states.1 The sample thus omitted over half of the judicial
districts in the United States, including some heavily populated and
commercially important jurisdictions such as Florida, Illinois, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. 1 2 Porter chose to include only bank-
ruptcy filings from the twenty-four states that permit non-judicial
foreclosure of a debtor's principal residences. 13 Porter apparently be-
lieved sampling a broader population that included bankruptcy filings
in judicial foreclosure states "may not produce different data."1 4 This,
however, is only a conjecture, and it may in fact be the case that sam-
pling a broader population would have produced different and perhaps
less striking results as to the extent of incompleteness of proof of claim
submissions. Porter even concedes this point in a brief footnote.
15
Another limitation of Porter's study was that the sample of proof
of claim submissions was drawn only from Chapter 13 bankruptcy fil-
ings and did not include any submissions made in Chapter 7 filings,
even though mortgage creditors must make proof of claim submissions
to obtain distributions in those proceedings as well. 16 Porter justified
this limitation on the basis that a higher proportion of Chapter 13 fil-
ings involve mortgage debts. 17 She conceded, however, that 30% of
Chapter 7 cases are filed by homeowners and thus often also involve
proof of claim submissions.' 8 A broader sample of proof of claim sub-
missions drawn from both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filings might
yield different, and perhaps less striking, results regarding the overall
extent of proof of claim incompleteness in all bankruptcy proceedings.
Furthermore, the sample of 1,733 bankruptcy cases drawn from
this restricted subpopulation may not have been sufficiently random-
ized.' 9 While the subsequent data coding by investigators appears to
have been carefully cross-checked to minimize (though admittedly not
to eliminate) the number of data recording errors,20 the sampled sub-
populations interestingly only include bankruptcy cases filed during
April 2006.21 This single month is a relatively small window of time
that may not accurately reflect the true characteristics of the much
11. Id. at 141.
12. Id. at 141, 142 n.132.
13. Id. at 142.
14. Id. at 141.
15. Id. at 142 n.134.
16. Id. at 141-42.
17. Id. at 141.
18. Id. at 141 n.127.
19. "Every fifth case filed" in April of 2006 in which the debtor owned a home was
selected for the sample, presumably selected on a randomized "every fifth file" basis
once the cases were ordered in their chronological order of filing. Id. at 141.
20. Id. at 144.
21. Id. at 141.
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larger collection of proof of claim submissions. In particular, the fact
that a very small number of cases was drawn from a set of smaller
judicial districts during only one month's time undercuts Porter's an-
cillary claim that her study shows "that the variations in claims docu-
mentation reveal systematic differences based on where a debtor files
for bankruptcy."22 The choice of a different sampling period could ob-
viously have altered rather dramatically the relative ranking of the
sampled districts with regard to the extent of incompleteness of the
proof of claim submissions, particularly for those smaller judicial dis-
tricts with fewer filings for a given sampling period.
A potentially fairly serious shortcoming of Porter's study is that
the proof of claim incompleteness percentage calculations are derived
only from the proof of claim submissions originally filed in each sam-
pled case and do not reflect any attachments that a mortgage creditor
may have included if it later filed amended claims.23 One would think
that in response to either formal or informal objections made by debt-
ors or their attorneys or bankruptcy trustees, mortgage creditors
would often augment their proof of claim submissions to include addi-
tional documentation omitted in the initial filing. To the extent that
such amendments were made after the original proof of claim submis-
sion, Porter's percentages would tend to overstate to some extent the
actual degree of incompleteness facing debtors when their bankruptcy
plans were actually formulated and judicially endorsed, perhaps sig-
nificantly so. Porter even conceded that 9.7% of the proof of claim sub-
missions in her sample were later amended. 2 4 One would think that
at least some of these amendments would have addressed incomplete-
ness in the original proof of claim submissions.
Finally, Porter sampled only proof of claim submissions made in
bankruptcy proceedings and did not sample comparable claim docu-
ments filed by mortgage creditors in the larger number of foreclosure
proceedings taking place outside of bankruptcy. 2 5 It is thus unclear
whether her findings regarding the extent of incompleteness is appli-
cable to non-bankruptcy foreclosure proceedings as well.
Each of the above shortcomings of Porter's sampling and data
analysis procedures, particularly her failure to reflect amended proof
of claim submissions in the data, serve to undercut somewhat the con-
fidence that one might otherwise have that her results accurately re-
flect the extent of proof of claim incompleteness in foreclosure
proceedings. Her results, however, are nevertheless rather striking.
22. Id. at 151.
23. Id. at 146 n.152.
24. Id. at 170.
25. Id. at 179. Roughly 80% of mortgage foreclosures take place outside of bank-
ruptcy. Id. at 179 n.275.
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Even if they are appropriately discounted to reflect any possible bias
the deficiencies in her sampling or data analysis procedures might
have introduced, they still strongly suggest that a surprisingly high
proportion of proof of claim submissions filed in bankruptcy proceed-
ings are formally incomplete in that they fail to provide all of the docu-
mentation called for by Section 3001. Such extensive incompleteness
arguably increases the potential for mortgage creditors to overcharge
debtors without being held accountable for doing so. As I will discuss
in some detail below, however, this does not necessarily indicate that
such abuses are in fact occurring.
Porter is, however, on far less solid statistical ground when she
argues that even for those proof of claim submissions that are formally
complete, in that they include all of the required documentation, the
format of the itemization statements is not standardized and is often
not helpful for debtors and their attorneys who wish to meaningfully
evaluate the accuracy of mortgage creditor claims.2 6 First, she defines
twelve categories of fees and charges that she believes should be sepa-
rately reflected in an itemized statement. 2 7 Then, she concludes that
43% of the approximately 1,483 itemized statements submitted 28 are
deficient in that they either make reference to fees and charges that
do not fit into this categorization or aggregate a number of these fees
and charges in a way that defies separation, 29 or both. Thus, the
statements do "not permit meaningful review of the accuracy or legal-
ity of the servicer's calculation of the debt."30
Porter's conclusion regarding the proportion of inadequately de-
tailed or inaccurate itemization statements can be criticized on two
grounds. First of all, for the reasons set forth above, Porter's sample
may not be representative of the entire population of mortgage foreclo-
sures, and a broader sample may have found a lower percentage of
deficient itemization statements even by her criteria of adequacy.
Much more fundamental, however, is the criticism that the category
disclosure format that she favors for itemization statements is not
generally recognized in the mortgage industry as the definitive
26. See id. at 152-61 (outlining the ways in which the failure to standardize
itemization of mortgage fees prohibits meaningful scrutiny).
27. Id. at 153. These categories include principal, interest, escrow, late charges,
foreclosure fees or costs, non-sufficient funds charges, property inspection fees, broker
price opinions or appraisals, corporate advances, post-petition fees, suspense fees, and a
twelfth category covering all other charges labeled "other." Id. at 153 n.174.
28. Id. at 146. She claimed that 83.9% of the 1768 proof of claim submissions in-
cluded an itemized statement for a total of approximately 1483 such itemized state-
ments. Id.




itemization statement disclosure framework. 3 1 Another observer
might define the contours of an adequate itemization statement differ-
ently and could therefore reach a different conclusion regarding the
proportion of proof of claim itemization submissions that are deficient.
Unlike her statistical arguments that measure the incompleteness of
proof of claim submissions by the legislatively-mandated yardstick of
the Section 3001 requirements, Porter's arguments as to the inade-
quacy of itemization statements are ultimately predicated simply
upon her own beliefs as to what form of itemization statement disclo-
sure would adequately allow for meaningful debtor and trustee re-
view. Such conclusions are, therefore, more like Porter's personal,
subjective judgments as to the proper balancing of debtor and creditor
interests in bankruptcy rather than "statistical" arguments based
upon objective data.
Porter also reviews the fees and charges claimed in the itemiza-
tion statements, which she classifies as "other" charges, in accordance
with her twelve-category classification scheme. She identifies what
she regards a significant number of claimed fees that appear to her to
be "suspicious," i.e., those that were impermissible or at least called
for more explanation.3 2 One could argue, however, that the number of
instances of questionable fees that she identifies may actually be quite
modest relative to the large size of her sample, perhaps even as low as
3.2%.3 3 In addition, she defines these suspicious claims using her own
preferred twelve-category itemization statement disclosure scheme for
fees and charges. A different classification scheme could well have re-
sulted in a different and perhaps smaller proportion of questionable
claims.
31. See id. at 152 (claiming there is no standard form for itemizations). Porter
claims, however, that this particular categorization framework is not merely her arbi-
trary creation but is based upon a model proof of claim itemization statement frame-
work that was recently developed by a joint committee of mortgage servicers and
Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustees. Id. at 153 n.175. She has a point here, although in
my opinion she goes a bit too far in representing the product of one joint committee of
Chapter 13 trustees and mortgage servicers that has not yet received formal federal
legislative or administrative endorsement as constituting a definitive statement of "the
servicing industry's own categories" by which the adequacy of itemization statements
can properly be judged. Id. at 152-54.
32. Id. at 154.
33. Her specific claim is that she identified 'dozens and dozens" of such fees. Id. at
154. It is unclear whether she meant this phrase literally, which would mean perhaps
only as few as four dozen such instances of questionable charges, approximately 3.2% of
the sample of 1,483 itemization statements, or whether she intended to use this phrase
more figuratively to suggest that she found there to be more questionable charges than
one might expect. One could perhaps argue that if only 3.2% of the itemization state-
ments include any fees or charges that are suspicious enough on their face to call for
more investigation before they are accepted by debtors, that this is in fact an indicia of
reasonably good performance by mortgage creditors.
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Finally, one must of course keep in mind that even if a fee charged
to a defaulting debtor appears on its face to be "suspicious," closer in-
vestigation may reveal that the charge is justified. Suspicions are not
always well founded. For example, Steve Bailey, the former Chief Ex-
ecutive for Loan Administration of Countrywide Financial Corpora-
tion, a large mortgage servicing firm since it was acquired by the
Bank of America, testified at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing
held on May 6, 2008, that his corporation's internal reviews of bank-
ruptcy proceedings in which it was involved indicated an error rate of
"less than one percent for mistakes that adversely impact a
borrower."3 4
III. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE "WIDESPREAD MORTGAGE
CREDITOR ABUSE" ARGUMENT
In her article, Porter exhibits a fundamental ambivalence as to
whether she is taking the position that her study indicates not only
that there is pervasive proof of claim incompleteness, but that there is
also widespread mortgage creditor abuse of debtors in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings facilitated by this incompleteness or (in her opinion) the mis-
leading nature of many proof of claim submissions. Throughout her
article Porter liberally sprinkles pejorative phrases that suggest she
believes widespread exploitation is taking place.3 5 Yet at several
points in her article Porter candidly concedes that her data is simply
not sufficient to establish that this is, in fact, the case.3 6 While a care-
34. Policing Lenders, supra note 3 (statement of Steve Bailey, Chief Executive for
Loan Administration, Countrywide Financial Corporation). "Bankruptcy servicing is a
complex process .... As such, to some unavoidable extent, the servicing process re-
quires manual input or by-hand processing of data unique to each borrower." Id. Bailey
continued, stating, "This type of processing can result in mistakes from time to time.
However, those mistakes are few in number. Countrywide has completed a number of
internal reviews that indicate an error rate of less than one percent for mistakes that
adversely impact a borrower." Id.
35. "This Article's findings offer an empirical measure of... whether consumers
can trust mortgage companies to adhere to applicable laws." Porter, supra note 1, at
abstract. "The data . . . raise the specter that many bankrupt families may be
overcharged or may unfairly lose their homes .... [The] flawed system of mortgage
servicing is a key contributor to the current crisis in the American home-mortgage mar-
ket." Id. at 124 (emphasis added). "The key point that can be substantiated by the
itemization data is that . .. [tihe resulting situation permits servicers to overcharge
debtors without fear of challenge. These problems suggest that the bankruptcy system
may be harboring mortgage-servicing abuse .... " Id. at 160 (emphasis added). "Credi-
tors' claims may themselves be bloated and overstate the accurate amounts of debt.") Id.
at 167 (emphasis added). "The data provide systematic evidence that mortgage ser-
vicers ... may be engaged in overreaching .... "Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
36. "[It is] impossible to use the Mortgage Study data to apply systematic analyses
to determine if servicers are actually charging illegal fees. The available bankruptcy
court records simply do not provide the necessary information." Id. at 154. "[Tlhe data
admittedly do not permit concrete findings of servicer misconduct . . . ." Id. at 160.
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ful reader of her article will note the critically important distinction
between her statistically-grounded findings of pervasive proof of claim
documentation deficiencies and her more anecdotal assessments of the
extent of creditor abuse, a distinction Porter herself recognizes, I fear
that more cursory reviewers (or those with an ax to grind) may over-
look this distinction,3 7 particularly given Porter's generally pejorative
tone with regard to the conduct of mortgage servicers.
Porter bases her argument that mortgage creditors are overcharg-
ing debtors in bankruptcy proceedings largely upon a comparison be-
tween debtors' and creditors' separate calculations as to the amount of
the mortgage debt owed.38 She found that debtors and creditors, in
their initial submissions, agreed on the exact amount due in only 4.4%
of the bankruptcy proceedings.3 9 In 70.4% of the proceedings, the
mortgage creditor's proof of claim submission asserted that the mort-
gage debt was greater than the amount the debtor listed on his sched-
ule of debts, and, interestingly, in 25.2% of the cases the debtor's
scheduled amount of mortgage debt exceeded the mortgage creditor's
claim.40 In instances where the creditor's claim exceeded the debtor's
scheduled amount, the average difference was $6,039, with a rela-
tively large standard deviation of $9,143, indicating a wide dispersion
in the size of the creditor-favoring discrepancies.4 1
Porter's statistical data effectively demonstrates the pervasive-
ness of misunderstandings between debtors and mortgage creditors in
bankruptcy proceedings as to the amount owed. Additionally, her
data shows that in most instances the creditor believes debtor owes
more than the debtor thinks he does, at least with regard to the re-
stricted subpopulation of Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings filed in
certain districts during April 2006 from which her sample was drawn.
In such cases, obviously at least one party has an incorrect belief as to
the amount owed. Porter's discrepancy calculations, however, are un-
fortunately equally susceptible to either of two very different compet-
ing interpretations, and her study unfortunately does not provide a
statistical basis for choosing between these different interpretations.
One interpretation of these discrepancy calculations, the one that
Porter implicitly favors, is that these discrepancies largely reflect
creditor overcharges, presumably facilitated by incomplete or mislead-
ing bankruptcy proof of claim submissions. But, another interpreta-
37. See, e.g., Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 59.
38. Porter, supra note 1, at 161-68.
39. Id. at 162.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 164 & n.223. Another 8.8% of the loans in her sample had mortgage
claims that were more than 15% larger than the amounts debtors included on their
schedules. See Porter, supra note 1, at 165.
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tion of these discrepancies, one at least as plausible if not more so, is
that the data reflects the simple fact that typical homeowner debtors
are just not as good as typical mortgage creditors at keeping accurate
records because they are not as familiar with unpaid interest charges,
default charges, attorneys' fees, and numerous other sometimes sub-
stantial legitimate charges added to principal repayment obligations
in real estate foreclosure proceedings. This latter interpretation,
which grounds the discrepancy data primarily upon debtor misunder-
standings rather than creditor overcharges, draws at least some sup-
port from Porter's observation that over 25% of debtors believed they
actually owed more to the mortgage creditor than their creditor had
calculated. One would think that this belief would rarely, if ever, be
accurate. Such a widespread misunderstanding suggests that debtors
are not particularly good at calculating their mortgage obligations for
the purposes of bankruptcy filings. By finding a bankruptcy mortgage
servicing rate for errors adverse to debtors of less than 1%, Country-
wide Financial Corporation's internal reviews described above also
lend support to this interpretation of the discrepancy. 42
Porter calculated an aggregate creditor-favoring net discrepancy
of approximately $6 million between debtor schedules and creditor
proof of claim submissions for her entire sample of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. 43 She then used this sample figure to extrapolate to a total
creditor-favoring discrepancy of $1 billion for the entire population of
approximately 400,000 Chapter 13 bankruptcies filed by homeowners
"in recent years."44
On this basis she then forcefully declares, "If even a small fraction
of this billion dollar aggregate sum represents creditor overreaching
in their claims, the damage to the bankruptcy process is tremen-
dous[,]"4 5 and that "[i]f creditors are overreaching by even half of the
amount suggested" by this extrapolation "they are imposing a hefty
burden on debtors' disposable incomes . . ."4 I have no argument
there, but the critical question is to what extent does this discrepancy
data reflect creditor overcharges, as opposed to debtor miscalcula-
tions? Broad statements regarding the financial significance of vari-
ous postulated amounts of creditor overreaching obviously do not
provide support for concluding that such debtor overcharges are in
fact taking place at more than the de minimis rate identified by the
42. Policing Lenders, supra note 3 (statement of Steve Bailey, Chief Executive for
Loan Administration, Countrywide Financial Corporation).
43. Porter, supra note 1, at 166.
44. Id. at 166.
45. Id. at 167.
46. Id. at 167.
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Countrywide Financial Corporation internal reviews.4 7 Porter's study
identifies the pattern and extent of the discrepancies between debtor
and creditor perceptions of the amounts owed for her sample, but un-
fortunately does not shed much, if any, light on the underlying causes
of those discrepancies.
One further interesting piece of information that Porter repeat-
edly refers to in her article is that debtors objected to only about 4% of
the proof of claim submissions in her sample. 48 This low percentage of
formal objections is open to quite a number of possible interpretations.
One interpretation favored by Porter is that the incomplete proof of
claim submissions and misleading itemization statements together
make it difficult or impossible for many debtors to challenge creditor
overcharges. Another plausible, yet very different interpretation, is
that the proof of claim submissions filed by mortgage creditors are
generally accurate as to the amounts owed, and there simply are very
few instances where a debtor who closely scrutinized the proof of claim
submission would conclude he has a legitimate objection to the
amount. Yet another plausible interpretation is that this low formal
objection percentage is misleading because it fails to capture instances
where the debtor has scrutinized the claim and then informally settles
the dispute about the amount with the creditor. 49 Finally, it is possi-
ble that some disagreements as to the amounts claimed by creditors
are addressed not by formal or informal objections but instead are
handled through the process of judicial adoption of debtor plans that
incorporate the lesser amount of the mortgage debt the debtor believes
he owes, in the absence of creditor objections. 50 Porter's study unfortu-
nately does not provide any basis for choosing among these alternative
explanations for the low percentage of debtor objections.
IV. DISCUSSION OF PORTER'S RECOMMENDATIONS
Porter offers several recommendations designed to address the al-
leged widespread mortgage creditor overreaching in bankruptcy facili-
tated by incomplete or misleading creditor proof of claim submissions.
First, she argues that Bankruptcy Code Section 502(b) 5 1 should be
47. See Policing Lenders, supra note 3 (statement of Steve Bailey, Chief Executive
for Loan Administration, Countrywide Financial Corporation).
48. See Porter, supra note 1, at 168 (claiming 67 objections were identified for the
1,768 sampled proof of claim submissions).
49. Porter recognizes this possibility, but then argues that this interpretation is
"incongruent with the rare incidence of amended claims." Id. Porter's study indicates
that creditors amend 9.7% of bankruptcy filings. Id. Not everyone would agree that
amendments that occur in 9.7% of bankruptcy filings should be classified as "rare"
events.
50. This possibility is acknowledged by Porter. Id. at 165 n.237.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2005).
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amended to allow failure to provide the proof of claim documentation
required by Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Section 3001
("Section 3001") as a basis for claim disallowance. 52 Second, she wants
the United States Trustees Program to adopt informal measures to
encourage bankruptcy trustees to more carefully review mortgage
creditor claims. 53 Third, she favors the adoption of a standardized for-
mat for proof of claim itemization statements, and in particular, calls
for the incorporation into official bankruptcy forms of a model proof of
claim itemization form recently prepared by a joint committee of mort-
gage industry representatives and bankruptcy trustees. 54 Finally,
she calls for the institution of programs to educate mortgage debtors'
attorneys about the potential benefits of challenging mortgage credi-
tor claims, including the collateral benefits of helping them identify
other potential causes of action such as loan origination disclosure de-
ficiencies or other abuses and recognize unfair or deceptive
practices. 55
In order to properly assess the merits of Porter's recommenda-
tions, two kinds of information are needed. First, additional research
is necessary to ascertain the extent and severity of mortgage creditor
overreaching that would likely be detected or deterred by the proposed
measures and to quantify the social benefits of such detection and de-
terrence. Second, it would be necessary to determine the amount of
additional administrative costs that would be imposed upon mortgage
servicers, bankruptcy trustees, and others by these more stringent
proof of claim requirements. Further, we must determine the cost of
Porter's recommended attorney education programs. One could then
judge whether the economic and social benefits of these preventative
measures justified their costs. Even if such measures would be suc-
cessful in reducing creditor overcharging, they might not be the most
cost-effective approach for dealing with the problem.
As discussed above, Porter's study persuasively demonstrates
that many Chapter 13 proof of claim submissions are incomplete with
regard to Section 3001 requirements. She argues somewhat less con-
vincingly, however, that even formally complete proof of claim submis-
sions are often so misleading as to preclude effective review. In
addition, she does not offer statistical evidence to show these incom-
plete or misleading submissions actually have led to creditor abuse.5 6
Her arguments that such abuse is both taking place and facilitated by
52. Porter, supra note 1, at 173-74.
53. Id. at 174.
54. Id. at 174-75.
55. Id. at 177-78.
56. Porter's study persuasively demonstrates that many Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proof of claim submissions are incomplete with regard to the requirements of Section
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the proof of claim documentation deficiencies are anecdotal rather
than grounded in reliable statistical data. In addition, the only refer-
ence in her article germane to the question of the cost-effectiveness of
her recommendations is her brief and rather casual statement that
"[w]hile such reforms would modestly increase the administrative bur-
dens, the benefits of increased reliability in mortgage claims justify
these policy changes."5 7 Any serious consideration of her recommen-
dations would obviously require more precise data regarding the bene-
fits and costs involved.
V. CONCLUSION
Porter's comprehensive empirical study, despite its limitations
discussed above, breaks new ground in this important area. It pro-
vides a valuable resource for those who seek to better understand the
bankruptcy mortgage foreclosure process and to determine what re-
forms may be needed. Her study strongly suggests that a surprisingly
high proportion of proof of claim submissions by mortgage creditors in
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings are incomplete, and therefore the
potential for creditor abuse exists. As I have noted, however, a num-
ber of limitations in her sampling methodology undercut the confi-
dence that one might have that her conclusions can be generalized to
all bankruptcies and all non-bankruptcy foreclosure proceedings. On
the other hand, Porter's data does not provide solid statistical support
for her conclusion that the format of many itemization statements is
not designed to allow debtors or trustees to meaningfully review credi-
tor claims for accuracy. Her statistics also do not provide sufficient
support for the far stronger claim that deficient proof of claim submis-
sions have actually led to widespread mortgage creditor overreaching.
For her sample, Porter identified a pervasive discrepancy between
bankruptcy debtor and mortgage creditor calculations of the amount
of debt owed. She found that the creditor usually claims the debtor
owes more than the debtor thinks he does, but her empirical data does
not support the conclusion that this discrepancy primarily reflects
creditor overcharges rather than debtor calculation errors. Her data
is consistent with either of these interpretations of this discrepancy.
In closing, Porter recommends legislative and/or regulatory re-
forms that would encourage (or even require) mortgage creditors to
file more complete proof of claim submissions with what she regards
as more accurate and transparent itemization statements. Without
some solid statistical data showing how much creditor overcharging
3001 but argues somewhat less convincingly that even those formally complete proof of
claim submissions are often so misleading as to preclude effective review.
57. Porter, supra note 1, at 175.
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(presumably facilitated and sheltered by incomplete or misleading
proof of claim submissions) is in fact taking place, however, it is im-
possible to determine whether her proposed reforms, which would per-
haps impose substantial additional administrative costs upon
mortgage creditors and bankruptcy trustees, are cost-justified.
Porter's work is good science because, even with its limitations, it
provides useful guidance for other researchers who want to advance
the analytical effort in this important area. She persuasively estab-
lishes the pervasiveness of mortgage creditor proof of claim deficien-
cies in bankruptcy proceedings. Her study, however, raises more
questions than it answers. What are now clearly needed are further
studies, similar to Countrywide Financial Corporation's internal re-
view,58 that focus more intensively upon smaller, but still representa-
tive, samples of incomplete or allegedly misleading proof of claim
submissions to determine how often and to what extent such deficient
filings are facilitating mortgage creditor overcharges. Do the "dozens
and dozens" of fees that Porter found to be "suspicious" in her sample
of 1,483 itemization statements59 perhaps reflect only a less than 1%
rate of inclusion of unjustified fees in those statements, as Country-
wide Financial Corporation's internal reviews suggested, 60 or are the
error rates much higher? How often do such suspicious fees and
charges reflect actual creditor abuse through overcharges, as opposed
to merely being poorly described but nevertheless legitimate foreclo-
sure fees and charges? How effective would Porter's recommendations
be in reducing the prevalence and size of such overcharges? And, fi-
nally, what would it cost to implement Porter's reforms to remedy
proof of claim deficiencies and otherwise facilitate closer review of
mortgage creditor claims? All of these questions need to be answered
before reform proposals can be properly assessed.
58. See Policing Lenders, supra note 3 (statement of Steve Bailey, Chief Executive
for Loan Administration, Countrywide Financial Corporation).
59. Which may actually only reflect as little as approximately 3.2% of all of the
itemization forms in Porter's sample. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
60. See Policing Lenders, supra note 3 (statement of Steve Bailey, Chief Executive
for Loan Administration, Countrywide Financial Corporation).
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